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ableness of the assumption of jurisdiction. In all cases, even though the court
determines that jurisdiction is reasonable, the separate doctrine of forum non
conveniens may still apply.
VIRGINIA B. COWAN
RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 1
The key words in this clause of the Fifth Amendment--"private prop-
erty," "public use," "just compensation," "taken"-provide an outline for
the problems in eminent domain.2 The decisions of the Supreme Court have
produced more or less concrete definitions of "private property" 3 and "public
use."4 But they have not as clearly settled the problems of what constitutes a
"taking" and what are the exact requirements of "just compensation."
WHEN Is PROPERTY "TAKEN"
Property is said to be "taken" when the owner is deprived of its use.5
However, governmental activity resulting in extreme restriction of use, and
perhaps involving substantial monetary loss to the owner, can occur without
a "taking" in the eminent domain sense.8 For example, a regulatory law may
prohibit property from being used for the very purpose for which it was
designed and apart from which it is of little value.7 If the regulatory law
is an otherwise valid exercise of legislative power, the resulting loss to the
owner of the property is deemed indirect and incidental. Price and rent
controls restrict the owner's freedom to deal with his property, but the
losses that may occur because of such restrictions are not compensable be-
cause there has been no "taking." In all of these cases the governmental
1. U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. V.
2. Eminent domain is the power inherent in the sovereign to take private property
for public use. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 23 L. Ed. 449 (1876) ; 1 NICHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (3d ed. 1950).
3. Any interest having a monetary value which can be transferred from one owner
to another. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 69 Sup. Ct. 1434, 93 L.
Ed. 1765 (1949).
4. If the end is within any of the constitutional powers of government, the public use
requirement is met. See Notes, 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 285 (1946), 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1948).
5. United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 23 Sup. Ct. 349, 47 L. Ed. 539 (1903);
Cormack, Legal Concepts it Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221 (1931).
,6. E.g., Brown v. Winter, 50 F. Supp. 804 (W.D. Wis. 1943). Compensation for
"damage" to property under certain constitutional and statutory requirement is outside
the scope of this discussion. See note 32, infra.
7. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 Sup. Ct. 143, 60 L. Ed. 348 (1915);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205 (1887).
8. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 Sup. Ct. 641, 88 L. Ed. 892 (1944) (rent




agency is not seeking, itself, to use or appropriate property; it is concerned
with reaching an objective deemed desirable in the public interest and unre-
lated to governmental use of, or appropriation of, the property affected by the
law.
This does not mean that some agency of government must be intending
to exercise the power of emindnt domain in order for there to be a "taking."
In United States v. Caesby,9 military planes flying at a low altitude, at
frequent and regular intervals, over a poultry farm were causing direct and
indirect losses to the owner, finally forcing him to give up the chicken business.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Claims that the flight of the
planes resulted in the taking of an easement over claimant's property for which
compensation was required. The case was remanded for more precise findings
as to the extent of the easement, the court saying, "[A] n accurate description
of the property taken is essential, since that interest vests in the United
States."' 0 Paradoxically, it may be noted, therefore, that regulatory laws
purposing directly to limit or forbid the owner's use of his property do not
result in a "taking," while governmental activity contemplating no restriction
on use of property may nevertheless constitute a "taking." The power of
eminent domain is always incidental to the exercise of some other govern-
mental power. The key question appears to be whether or not the Government,
in the course of reaching its objective, is itself occupying an interest of the
property owner. The borderline between facts which meet this test, however,
and those which constitute merely a restriction incidental to regulation may
seem tenuous at times."1
Special problems with respect to "taking" are presented when the Federal
Government embarks on a navigation or flood-control project. In the recent
case of United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. C&.,1 2 the company owned
highly productive agricultural land located on a small stream. The stream
emptied into the Mississippi River at a point approximately a mile and a half
from the property. An agency of the United States built a dam on the
Mississippi downstream from the property in question, constantly maintaining
the river at its previous high water level. The company's property was above
this level, but the underflow and percolation of water destroyed the agri-
9. 328 U.S. 256, 66 Sup. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed. 1206 (1946), 35 CALIF. L. REV. 110
(1947).
10. 328 U.S. at 267.
11. The state, in the exercise of police power, may also interfere with the use of
private property without incurring liability. New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage
Comm'n, 197 U.S. 453, 25 Sup. Ct. 471, 49 L. Ed. 831 (1905) ; New York & N.E.R.R. v.
Bristol, 151 U.S. 556, 14 Sup. Ct. 437, 38 L. Ed. 269 (1894). The lack of a reasonable
basis for a restrictive regulation has been deemed to result in the taking of property.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 Sup. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922) ;
Rivera v. R. Cobian Chinea & Co., 181 F.2d 974 (lst Cir. 1950). But if it is borne in
mind that some interest in property must, itself, be vested in the government, when
there is a taking, these decisions appear to be questionable.
12. 339 U.S. 799, 70 Sup. Ct. 885, 94 L. Ed. 1277 (1950).
[ VoL. 4
cultural value of the land. A majority of the Supreme Court held that this
underflowing was analogous to the actual flooding of private property. Hence,
there was a taking, and compensation was allowed to the extent of the
damage.'
The power of Congress to legislate for the improvement of navigation
is plenary and the Federal Government possesses sufficient interest in the
bed of navigable streams to accomplish this purpose. 14 Therefore, riparian
owners on navigable waters hold their property subject to a dominant servi-
tude.1" This extends to the high water mark, and Congress may authorize
activity causing loss to riparian property below the high water level, even
destroying its use completely; and no compensation will be required.'6
Riparian owners on nonnavigable streams are not subject to the same
dominant servitude and, hence, have been afforded greater protection." The
decision in the Kansas City Life case apparently extends governmental lia-
bility to such owners even further, for the water did not actually invade the
surface of the property. The right of the Government to maintain the
Mississippi at high water level is unquestionable; and similar damage in-
flicted on owners riparian to the Mississippi would not have constituted a
"taking," since the Government would merely be using an interest in land
that it already possessed. Another riparian owner on the nonnavigable
tributary, or perhaps even the State of Missouri, could have inflicted the
same injury to the company without any liability.' 8
The importance of this decision can easily be ascertained when it is
borne in mind that the back water from a dam which actually floods thou-
sands of acres 1 may very well have adverse effect upon thousands of addi-
tional acres. Riparian owners on nonnavigable streams will not be injured,
13. Five Justices so held. Justice Minton dissented on the ground that the United
States should not be required to pay for doing that which another riparian owner could
have done without liability. 339 U.S. at 814. Justice Douglas, with Justices Black, Reed
and Minton, dissented ol the ground that the respondent was claiming a property right
in the unfettered flow of the Mississippi in its natural state, all "inconceivable concept."
Id. at 812.
14. Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 1011, 57 L. Ed. 1363 (1913)
ef. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 Sup. Ct. 291, 85
L. Ed. 243 (1940).
15. Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 24 Sup. Ct. 238, 48 L. Ed. 414 (1904).
Property here is used reservedly, it being doubtful whether or not an individual can have
a property right in a navigable stream. See Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 324, 341, 13 Sup. Ct. 622, 37 L. Ed. 463 (1893).
16. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 312 U.S. 592, 61 Sup. Ct. 772, 85 L.
Ed. 1064 (1941); United States v Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53,
33 Sup. Ct. 667, 57 L. Ed. 1063 (1913). Compensation is required in all cases where the
level is raised above high water mark. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 20 L.
Ed. 557 (1872).
17. E.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 37 Sup. Ct. 380, 61 L. Ed. 746 (1917).
18. Dissent, Mr. Justice Minton, 339 U.S. at 814. It is interesting to note that
government engineers advocated payment to the company from the outset.
19. Liability has always been imposed for the actual flooding of property. Pumpelly
v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 20 L. Ed. 557 (1872).
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moneywise, while owners on navigable streams will continue to bear the
burden of a dominant servitude. But factually there seems little reason for
making the nonnavigable riparian owner whole at the public's expense under
these circumstances, while forcing the navigable riparian owner to benefit the
public without compensation-when the damage to both is caused by the
same act.
Besides the flooding of lands or underflow thereof, other types of in-
juries may be inflicted on property rights. The most usual type is the loss of
power-heads at individually owned dams.2 0 With few exceptions, compensa-
tion has been granted where the private dam is on a nonnavigable stream.21
The distance from where the dam is situated to the navigable part of the
stream apparently is of little importance.
JUST COMPENSATION
The problem of "just compensation," arising whenever it is established
that property has been taken, presents even greater difficulties than those
discussed above. The court must see that the individual is afforded his con-
stitutional rights and at the same time must protect the public against ex-
orbitant prices. 22 Various methods have been proposed and used in the carry-
ing out-of this dual obligation, with the "fair market value" generally regarded
as the most satisfactory basis.23 Fair market value, is theoretically, that which a
willing seller would take and a willing buyer offer. In a condemnation pro-
ceeding, one of these factors (a willing seller) will almost always be absent.
The court must, therefore, disregard any personal considerations and separate
the incidental from the necessary elements, in arriving at a fair price. The
trend at the present time is to extend the liability of the Government in pace
with its steadily expanding activities. 24 Governmental activity involving just
compensation under eminent domain has centered largely, in this century,
in three fields which may be discussed separately.
(a) Condemnation of Fees in River Projects
Here, market value is usually deemed just compensation but is not al-
ways easily ascertained.23 5 Clearly, peculiar value to the individual cannot be
20. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 37 Sup. Ct. 380, 61 L. Ed. 746 (1917).
21. Ibid. But see United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 504, 506,
65 Sup. Ct. 761, 89 L. Ed. 1101 (1945). This latter decision would seem to be basically
inconsistent with the Kansas City Life case.
22. Cubbins v. Mississippi River Conm'n, 241 U.S. 351, 36 Sup. Ct. 671, 60 L. Ed.
1041 (1916).
23. Dolan, Present Day Court Practice in Condemnation Suits, 31 VA. L. REv. 9
(1944).
24. The Supreme Court has never devised a rigid formula for determining just
compensation. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 69 Sup. Ct. 1086, 93 L. Ed. 1592
(1949) ; Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 54 Sup. Ct. 704, 78 L. Ed. 1236 (1934).
25. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 Sup. Ct. 276, 87 L. Ed. 336 (1943).
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considered. 26 But special adaptability to the use for which the property is
condemned is an element, if there is a possibility that the property might be
used by anyone other than the condemn or.2 7 Evidence as to the most valuable
use to which the land is adaptable is also admissible 2 8 Enhanced value brought
about by the project for which the land is condemned will be discounted if
the land is situated within the area probably needed for the project, but the
higher value is allowed if it is not within such area. 29 Often, only a portion oi
a given plot of land will be taken. Compensation is then allowed to the extent
of the whole, minus the value of that remaining. °0 By this procedure com-
pensation is given for loss of access to highways, damage to business, and
other types of incidental injuries. This is true, however, only when that which
is taken is part of one parcel and not where one owner holds several different
parcels, with one separate parcel being condemned.3 1
Congress, when launching public projects in recent years, has recognized
rights and authorized compensation for injuries which would be damnurn
absque injuria under eminent domain principlesA2 Relatively few cases have
come before the Court as compared to the high number of condemnations.
Most of the cases arising have involved peculiar facts presenting genuine legal
questions.
(b) Condemnation of Interests Less Than Fees
During a national emergency the Government needs factories, floor
space for expanding offices, and vast expanses of land for the military. This
property, while indispensable during the emergency, would probably be of
little value in normal times. If this property were acquired in fee, valuation
would be at inflationary prices, while resale might very well be in a reces-
sionary period, necessarily adding to the public expense. To avoid this the
Government condemns for a period, definite or indefinite.
In United States v. General Motors Corp.,33 the Secretary of War
instituted proceedings to condemn a leasehold interest held by General
26. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 69 Sup. Ct. 1434, 93 L. Ed.
1765 (1949); United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 63 Sup. Ct. 1047, 87 L. Ed.
1390 (1943).
27. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 54 Sup. Ct. 704, 78 L. Ed. 1236 (1934);
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 25 L. Ed. 206 (1879).
28. McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342, 56 Sup. Ct.. 764, 80 L. Ed. 1205
(1936); Cameron Development Co. v. United States, 145 F.2d 209 (5th Ci-. 1944)
(additional compensation denied on the ground that there was no market available for
the shell marl located on the land).
29. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 69 Sup. Ct. 1086, 93 L. Ed. 1392 (1949);
Note, Recent Developments in the Federal Law of Valuation in Eminent Domain, 26
TEXAs L. REv. 199 (1947).
30. United States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180, 31 Sup. Ct. 162, 55 L. Ed. 165 (1911).
31. Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341, 24 Sup. Ct. 114, 48 L. Ed. 211 (1903).
32. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 70 Sup. Ct. 955, 94
L. Ed. 1231 (1950) ; International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 51 Sup. Ct.
176, 75 L. Ed. 410 (1931).
33. 323 U.S. 373, 65 Sup. Ct 357, 89 L. Ed. 311 (1945), discussed in Note, 26
TEXAs L. RLv. 199 (1947).
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Motors for a twenty year term. The period condemned was less than the
remaining time under the lease. The Government argued that the value of
the property condemned ought to be computed in terms of the rental value
of the full lease. The Supreme Court held that this would not be just coi-
pensation. Only the "market rental value" of the short term would provide
that. Factors to be included would be the cost to the company of moving
out machinery, preparing the property for the nev tenant, labor, materials
and transportation. A long term lessee would consider these factors in comi-
puting a short term sub-lease, and a short term lessee would expect to pay
for them.
It is to be noted that the term condemned here was for a period less than
that still held by the lessee. When the entire term is condemned, no compensa-
tion is allowed for the expense of moving out, on the theory that this is an
expense which the lessee would ultimately have to bear in any event.34 Where
the lessee has an option to renew, the value of that must also be considered.3
When the Government leases land, it occupies the position of any other
lessee. If there is nothing to the contrary in the lease, additions will inure to
the benefit of the lessor.30 Thus the Government may add value to land for
which it may later have to pay, if it then takes the land by eminent domain
proceedings.3 7
Disputes arising between labor and management may endanger public
health and safety, as well as hamper the national effort in time of war.
Sometimes it is necessary for the Government to take over a business so
affected in order to put it back in operation. Labor may receive a wage in-
crease as a result, thus adding to operating expenses. Two recent Court of
Claims cases have held that when this occurs the Government must compensate
the owner, not only for the fair rental value of the business, but also for the
increased operational expenses, including wage increases
3 s
Just compensation in this field is difficult to determine. Loss of business
opportunities, damage to trade routes, advantages gained by competitors-
all are incidental damages as far as eminent domain is concerned. Actually,
these things are quite real and may occasion a great loss, but the loss must
be borne by the owner and not the public.
34. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 261, 70 Sup. Ct.
644, 94 L. Ed. 816 (1950) (condemnation for a term, with an option to renew). A
vigorous dissent urged that the Government should condemn for a definite period, in
order that the rights of the parties might be readily ascertained. For a discussion of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, see 2 VAND. L. REv. 477 (1949).
35. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 66 Sup. Ct. 596, 90 L. Ed. 729
(1946).
36. United States v. Five Parcels of Land, 180 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 812 (1950).
37. 4 VAND. L. REv. 361 (1950).
38. Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 426 (Ct. CI. 1950) ; Wheelock Bros.,
Inc. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 278 (Ct. CI. 1950).
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(c) Requisitions of Materials and Products
This is the field in which the fundamental concepts of eminent domain
are most difficult to reconcile with the constitutional limitations. It is well
settled that the determination of just compensation is a judicial question.
39
Yet, one of the incidents of a national emergency is price control. Under a
controlled system an administrative body sets a maximum price for which
a given article may be legally sold but does not compel the vendor to offer
his goods to the public.40 The controlled price may be, and usually is, lower
than it would be in a free market. This causes little trouble until the Govern-
ment requisitions materials and products which are under control.
In United States v. John J. Felin & Co.,41 the product requisitioned was
cured pork. A ceiling price had been placed on the product, but live hogs
and the price of labor were not controlled. Consequently, the replacement
price of pork was much higher than the ceiling price. The Court of Claims
held that replacement cost and not ceiling price represented just compensa-
tion.42 This holding was reversed by the Supreme Court, although a majority
did not concur on any of the grounds for the result. However, in United
States v. Commodities Trading Corp.,43 involving requisitions of pepper at
ceiling prices which were far below the cost to the company, the court held
unanimously that the ceiling price did not in itself represent the just compensa-
tion required by the Constitution. This offered little consolation to the com-
pany, for the Court also held that "retention" value could not be considered
in determining what was just, and that all the owner lost was a potential
profit for which compensation need not be paid. Thus, in both cases, the
ceiling price was deemed just compensation.
Value is established as of the date of the taking. 44 The cost to the owner
is not considered, as illustrated by the Commodities case. If the market value
happens to be greater than cost, the owner gains; if it is lower, he must
bear the loss; and this is true even though the market is controlled.45 Con-
versely, where there is a ready market, the Government cannot show that
the actual value to the owner-i.e., cost of production plus a reasonable
profit-is lower."0 Where there is no market for the property, isolated sales
of similar property may be considered in establishing value; but neither a
39. E.g., United States v. 3.71 Acres of Land, 50 F. Supp. 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1943).
40. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 70 Sup. Ct. 547, 94
L. Ed. 707 (1950).
41. 334 U.S. 624, 68 Sup. Ct. 1238, 92 L. Ed. 1614 (1948).
42. John J. Felin & Co. v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 1017 (Ct. C1. 1946).
43. 339 U.S. 121, 70 Sup. Ct. 547, 94 L. Ed. 707 (1950).
44. L. Vogelstein & Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 337, 43 Sup. Ct. 564 67 L. Ed.
1012 (1923).
45. Ibid.
46. United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 43 Sup. Ct. 565, 67
L. Ed. 1014 (1923).
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unique use to which the owner claims he can put the property nor the
reproduction cost where reproduction is unfeasible will be considered.
4 7
It is possible, in the requisitioning of materials, that the greatest injury
may be inflicted on one other than the owner, as shown by Oinnia Com-
inercial Co. v. United States.45 During World War I the company owned
a contract by which it acquired the right to purchase plate steel at a price far
below market value. The Federal Government requisitioned the entire output
of the steel company. The Court held that the contract rights of Omnia were
private property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, but found
that these rights had been injured only indirectly, stating that, "Frustration
and appropriation are essentially diffefent things. 49
War does not dispense with the constitutional requirement that just
compensation be made for property which is taken."0 This is a principle to
which the court has adhered through the years. At times it may be necessary
to restrict the individual's freedom to deal with his property, while not
actually taking it. Such a situation occurs under price controls. The loss to the
individual, here, consists of loss of prospective profits. It is in the interest
of the public that these profits are not allowed. While balancing the rights
of the individual against the public good, within the constitutional limitations,
is a delicate task, the Court has done a very creditable job. The ratio of the
number of cases settled out of court to those brought to trial speaks well for
the attitude of the administrative bodies toward the individual's property
rights. The Court has wisely refused to reduce to a rigid formula the re-
quirements of just compensation. Leeway is allowed for individual hardships
and for peculiar circumstances. Each case may be determined on its own
merits, with justice for the individual as well as protection of the public.
CARL E. JENKINS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT-ITS PRESENT SIGNIFICANCE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Although the phraseology of the prohibition may vary somewhat among
the states,' the usual statement of the constitutional restriction with which this
47. United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nay. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 70 Sup.
Ct. 217, 94 L Ed. 195 (1949).
48. 261 U.S. 502, 43 Sup. Ct. 437, 67 L. Ed. 773 (1923).
49. 261 U.S. at 513.
50. United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 43 Sup. Ct. 565, 67
L. Ed. 1014 (1923) ; United States v. J.. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct.
298, 65 L. Ed. 516 (1921).
1. The prohibitions for thn most part assume one of two forms. The Michigan Con-
stitution typifies one of these: "cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted.
. . " MicH. CoNsT. Art. II, § 15. The other common statement is that set forth in
the Tennessee Constitution: "nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." TENN.
CONST. Art. I, § 16. In addition to these disjunctive and conjunctive wordings
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note is concerned amounts to substantially the same as that set out in the
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States-that "cruel and
unusual punishments" shall not be "inflicted." 2 A minority of the states in-
clude also a provision that any punishment administered shall be proportioned
to the gravity of the offense.3 Even in the absence of a specific durational
restriction, numerous courts4 have held that the length of a sentence itself
may be so great in proportion to the, offense as to amount to cruel and un-
usual punishment. Included among them is the Supreme Court of the United
States.5 Conversely, other courts say that the limitation relates to mode of
punishment only.6
Only Connecticut7 and Vermont have no comparable provisions in their
constitutions. However, the Supreme Court of Vermont has stated that the
prohibition is a part of that state's common law8 and has made specific refer-
ence to the English Declaration of Rights,9 which included the prohibition.
Thus, in 47 of the states, cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden either
by express constitutional provision or by judicial decision. The early history
of Connecticut, the remaining state, amply shows that the restriction was con-
sidered of vital importance there also; it appeared in the laws of 1673, 1702
and 1715.10 A somewhat more comprehensive limitation is contained in the
of the limitation, a third type appears occasionally: "nor cruel punishments -in-
flicted." Ky. CoNsT. Bill of Rights § 17. South Carolina, in addition to the conjunctive
statement of the restriction, provides: "Corporal punishment shall not be inflicted."
S.C. CoNsT. Art. I, § 19. Apparently, no significance attaches to these variations; cruel
is the key word in all. See p. 685 infra.
2. U.S. CoNsT. AmEND. VIII.
3. IL.. CoNsT. Art. II, § 11; IND. CoNST. Art. I, § 16; ME. CONST. Art. I, § 9;
NED. CoNsT. Art. I, § 16; N.H. CoxsT. Pt. I, Art. XVIII; ORE. CoNsT. Art. I, § 16;
R.I. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8; W. VA. CO NST. Art. III, § 5.
4. E.g., State ex rel. Garvey v. Whitaker, 48 La. Ann. 527, 19 So. 457 (1896);
State v. Ross, 55 Ore. 450, 104 Pac. 596, 42 L.R.A. (N.s.) 601 (1909), rehearing, 55
Ore. 474, 106 Pac. 1022, 42 L.R.A. (x.s.) 613 (1910), writ of error dismissed, 227 U.S.
150, 33 Sup. Ct. 220, 57 L. Ed. 458 (1913); State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46
S.E.2d 273 (1948) ; see State v. Moilen, 140 Minn. 112, 167 N.W. 345, 347 (1918) ; Cason
v. State, 160 Tenn. 267, 23 S.W.2d 665, 667 (1930) ; Fisher v. McDaniel, 9 Wyo. 457,
64 Pac. 1056, 1061 (1901). See 1 CoOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONS 692 (8th ed.
1927).
5. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368, 30 Sup. Ct. 544,'54 L. Ed. 793
(1910).
6. State v. Griffin, 84 N.J.L. 429, 87 Atl. 138 (Sup. Ct. 1913), aff'd, 85 N.J.L. 613,
90 Atl. 259 (1914) ; see, e.g., People v. Morris, 80 Mich. 634, 45 N.W. 591, 592 (1890) ;
Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 447, 450 (1824). But see Hart v. Commonwealth,
131 Va. 726, 109 S.E. 582, 588 (1921) (question said to be an open one in Virginia).
See 48 W. VA. L.Q. 63 (1941) for a general discussion of duration of sentence as an
aspect of cruel and unusual punishments.
7. "No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly
warranted by law." CONN. CosT. Art. I, § 10. This provision now is indexed as the
"cruel and unusual" provision; but certainly a literal reading of the clause does not
convey this impression; and apparently no case has even raised the contention that it is
so applicable.
8. State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 Atl. 98, 102 (1934).
9. 1 Wm. & MAiY, 2d Sess., c.2 (1689).
10. See 34 MINN. L. REv. 134 (1950).
1951 ] NOTES
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations,"1 wherein
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is prohibited.
The roots of this clause are laid in English history even -prior to the
Norman Conquest. Indeed, the principle is said to have appeared as early
as 1042 in the laws of Edward the Confessor, 12 and it was carried forward in
Magna Charta.h The Declaration of Rights of 168814 expressed the first
specific prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments." This clause
was transferred verbatim to the Federal Bill of Rights and incorporated as
the Eighth Amendment. Thus, the clause has a long and continuous back-
ground in both English and American development.
INCLUSION IN DUE PROCESS
It has long been settled that the Eighth Amendment is, itself, no limita-
tion upon state action and that the only express limitation upon a state in
this matter is that imposed by its own law.15 The prevailing view has been
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not neces-
sarily incorporate the Eighth per se so as to restrain state action.1" The idea
of many that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth incor-
porated the entire Bill of Rights was rejected in the Slauzghter-House Cases;
17
a like result was reached in Davidson v. New Orleans'8 as to the operation of
the due process clause. 19 The attitude of the Court rather has been that the
abridgement of only those rights which are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" is a violation of due process where state action is involved.20 Although
the policy of the Court in resisting complete incorporation of the Bill of
11. See 6 U.N. BULL. 7 (1949). See also 7 U.N. BULL. 7, 8 (1949), where the
insertion of the provision into the draft of the International Covenant on Human Rights
is discussed.
12. See 34 MIxN. L. REV. 134, 135 n.15 (1950).
13. HEN. III, cc. 14, 29 (1225).
14. 1 W11. & AARY, 2d Sess., c.2 (1689).
15. E.g., Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, 35 Sup. Ct. 649, 59 L. Ed. 1071 (1915);
Pervear v. Massachusetts, 5 Wall. 475, 18 L. Ed. 608 (1866) ; Weber v. Commonwealth,
303 Ky. 56, 196 S.W.2d 465 (1946) ; see Ohio ex rel. Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445,
447, 24 Sup. Ct. 703, 48 L. Ed. 1062 (1904).
16. This doctrine has not been established without dissent. See Note, 21 So. CALIF.
L. REv. 47 (1947), for a discussion contending that all the rights of tile first eight Amend.
ments ought to have been applied to state action by virtue of the due process clause.
For an argument against its inclusion, see Note, 2 STAN. L. REv. 174 (1949), based oil
the questionable theory that it relates neither to procedural nor to substantive due process.
For an exhaustive analysis of the incorporation principle, see Fairman, Does the Four-
teenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights-The Original Understanding, 2
STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949); and Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rightsf-The Jvdicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949).
17. 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873). See Grant, The Natural Law Background
of Due Process, 21 COL. L. REv. 56 (1931) ; 22 ST. JOhN's L. REv. 270 (1948).
18. 96 U.S. 97, 24 L. Ed. 616 (1877).
19. See Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31 COL. L. Rvv. 56,
65-71 (1931); 22 ST. JoHNI'S L. REv. 270 (1948).
20. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 Sup. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937).
[ VOL,. 4
Rights2' still meets with vigorous dissent on occassion, 22 the test of in-
clusion2 3 seems to be whether the particular right is inherent in fundamental
principles of justice and liberty.
2 4
21. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-36, 60 Sup. Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937). See
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97 (1908). But see note
16 supra. Although the complete Bill of Rights is not included in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it would appear that the coverage of the Amendment is not limited to the rights
specifically enumerated in the first eight Amendments. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
47 Sup. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749 (1927) (criminal trial by judge with adverse interest) ;
see the dissenting opinion of Justice Murphy in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
123, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947), and the concurring opinion of Justice
Frankfurter in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466, 67 Sup. Ct.
374, 91 L. Ed. 422 (1947). See also Curtis, A Mfodern Supreme Court in A Modern
World, supra p. -.
22. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949).
Contrast the view urged by Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947), urging that the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment dictates outright inclusion of the Bill of Rights, with
the opposite contention advanced in Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Il-
corporate the Bill of Rights?-The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
See also 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 272 (1947).
23. In the application of the test, the Court has considered various factors as con-
trolling. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266, 68 Sup. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed. 682 (1948) (English
background of the particular right) ; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61-5, 53 Sup. Ct.
55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527 (1932) (importance in early American history);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97 (1908) (extent
of present-day necessity) ; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 663-68, 68 Sup. Ct. 763, 92 L.
Ed. 986 (1948) (lack of uniformity among states considered indicative of its non-
recognition).
24. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67, 53 Sup. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158
(1932) ; Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316, 47 Sup. Ct. 103, 71 L. Ed. 270 (1926) ;
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780 (1898). Illustrative
of how the Court makes its determination is the case of Powell v. Alabama, supra, where
ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, public hostility, the fact that no
friends or family were within distance of easy communication, the fact that defendants
were in deadly peril, etc., were considered so vital that effective appointment of counsel
was deemed essential to due process, the Court stating that to hold otherwise would
violate fundamental principles of justice inherent in the idea of free government. See
also Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 Sup. Ct. 1270, 92 L. Ed. 1647 (1948).
In this manner, several rights have been held to be within the protection of the
due process clause. E.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 Sup. Ct 255, 81 L. Ed.
278 (1937) (freedom of speech) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56
Sup. Ct. 444, 80 L. Ed. 660 (1936) (freedom of press) ; Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S.
245, 55 Sup. Ct. 197, 79 L. Ed. 343 (1934) (freedom of religion) ; Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931) (freedom of press). On thie other
hand, other rights have been specifically excluded. E.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 4 Sup. Ct. 111 (majority), 292 (minority), 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884) (right to action
by grand jury in capital cases) ; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 23 L. Ed. 678 (1875)
(right of trial by jury in civil controversies involving more than $20).
State action in this area is less narrowly restricted by the due process clause than
is federal action as measured by the Bill of Rights. Compare Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97 (1908) (mere violation by state of right
against self-incrimination not violative of due process, although similar action by federal
government would violate Fifth Amendment), with Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,
56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682 (1936) (excessiveness of state action in coercion of con-
fession violative of due process). See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50, 67
Sup. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947). Concerning the right of an accused to the aid
of counsel in a criminal case, contrast the standards applied in a federal criminal action
in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938),, with those
applied in a state criminal action in Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 68 Sup. "Ct. 763, 92
L. Ed. 986 (1948).
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On the basis of this criterion, it seems reasonably certain that the cruel-
and-unusual-punishment prohibition would be held to be within the purview
of the due process clause, thus binding upon the states, were the issue to be
presented squarely to the present Court. Surely the right possesses many of
the attributes of others held to be basic and fundamental. Furthermore,
there are indications that this result would be forthcoming. In Louisiana
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,25 the majority refused to state whether cruel and
unusual punishments were prohibited by due process, assuming without de-
ciding that this would be the case ;26 but the language indicates that they
would consider it included if the facts required a determination of the point.
2
7
The four dissenters were expressly of the opinion that cruel and unusual
punishment may be a denial of due process.2 8 Also, in the recent case of
Johnson v. Dye,29 the Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, specifically held that
the cruel-and-unusual-punishment provision is incorporated into the due
process clause. The court relied upon the Palko case30 and the Resweber case"1
in reaching this result. In light of these developments, there can be little
doubt that, when the necessity arises, the due process clause of the Fourteenth
will be held to proscribe cruel and unusual punishments inflicted by a state.
SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION
The apparent prospective importance of a federal constitutional prohibi-
tion against state infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, together with
the continuing vitality of the expressed restrictions of state law,8 2 makes
worthwhile a re-examination of the substantive aspect of these provisions. Two
related problems, beyond the scope of this discussion, are (1) the method of
invoking the restriction, and (2) the effect of a determination that a given
punishment is cruel and unusual." 3 In brief, the point has been raised by
25. 329 U.S. 459, 67 Sup. Ct. 374, 91 L. Ed. 422 (1947).
26. Id. at 462.
27. Id. at 463-64.
28. Id. at 472. Since that time, Justice Black, of the former majority, has indicated
that he would include all of the Bill of Rights. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
70-72, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947) (dissenting opinion). He, with the
others, would have constituted a majority of five who favored inclusion of the Eighth.
The recent deaths of two justices (Mr. Justice Murphy, July 19, 1949, and Mr. Justice
Rutledge, September 10, 1949), however, again make the question uncertain.
29. 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864, 70 Sup. Ct.
146, 94 L. Ed. 67 (1949) ; accord, Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.
Cal. 1950); Harper v. Wall, 85 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.J. 1949); see Siegel v. Ragen,
88 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ill. 1949), aff'd, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 990 (1950).
30. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 Sup. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937).
31. 329 U.S. 459, 67 Sup. Ct. 374, 91 L. Ed. 422 (1947).
32. Of course, the Eighth Amendment remains prohibitive of federal infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment.
33. For a general discussion of these two problems, see Horowitz and Steinberg,
The Fourteenth Amendment-Its Newely Recognized Impact on the "Scope" of Habeas
Corpus in Extradition, 23 So. CALIF. L. REV. 441 (1950) ; Sutherland, Due Process and
Cruel Punishment, 64 HARv. L. REv. 271 (1950) ; Note, 2 STAN. L. REv. 174 (1949) ; 62
HAxv. L. REv. 136 (1948); 23 So. CALiF. L. REv. 86 (1949).
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habeas corpus proceedings,3 4 by suit for injunction,3 5 by demurrer,3 6 by ap-
peal,3 as a defense to mandamus proceedings,38 as a basis for tort action39
and as a ground for executive clemency.40 A finding that a punishment is
cruel and unusual may result in discharge from custody,41 dismissal of pro-
ceedings, 42 nonenforcement of a statute,43 injunction against enforcement,"
reversal45 or modification, 46 or award of damages.
47
That the torturous and barbarous punishments which apparently induced
the first bans against cruel and unusual punishments are included within
their scope is too evident to require extended discussion.4" Such punishments
as drawing and quartering, disembowelling, stretching on the rack, breaking
on the wheel and burning alive are illustrative.49 However, the theory of
many authorities that whipping is included3 0 has been weakened by a number
of cases which have upheld this form of punishment.5 ' The thesis has been
34. See, e.g., Davis v. O'Connell, 185 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1950); Johnson v. Dye,
175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864, 70 Sup. Ct. 146, 94
L. Ed. 67 (1949); Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1950);
Harper v. Wall, 85 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.J. 1949) ; Ex parte Hibbs, 86 Okla. Cr. 113,
190 P.2d 156 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 835 (1948).
35. See, e.g., Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687 (D. Nev. 1918); Davis v. Berry,
216 Fed. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), reed on ground question moot, 242 U.S. 468, 37 Sup.
Ct. 208, 61 L. Ed. 441 (1917).
36. See, e.g., Kirschgessner v. State, 174 Md. 195, 198 Atl. 271 (1938).
37. See, e.g., Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 801 (1947) ; Garcia v. Territory, 1 N.M. 415 (1869).
38. See People ex rel. Robison V. Haug, 68 Mich. 549, 37 N.W. 21 (1888).
39. See, e.g., Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. 70 (1820).
40. See Gingerich v. State, 226 Ind. 678, 83 N.E.2d 47, 50 (1948).
41. See, e.g., Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds,
338 U.S. 864, 70 Sup. Ct. 146, 94 L. Ed. 67 (1949); Application of Middlebrooks, 88
F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1950) ; Harper v. Wall, 85 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.J. 1949) ; State
ex rel. Garvey v. Whitaker, 48 La. Ann. 527, 19 So. 457 (1896) ; People v. Betts, 142
Misc. 240, 254 N.Y. Supp. 786 (Co. Ct 1931).
42. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 Sup. Ct. 544, 54 L. Ed.
793 (1910).
43. See, e.g., People ex rel. Robison v. Haug, 68 Mich. 549, 37 N.W. 21 (1888).
44. See, e.g., Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687 (D. Nev. 1918); Davis v. Berry,
216 Fed. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd oh ground question moot, 242 U.S. 468, 37 Sup.
Ct. 208, 61 L. Ed. 441 (1917).
45. See, e.g., State v. Driver, 78 N.C. 423 (1878) ; State v. Ross, 55 Ore. 450, 104
Pac. 596, 42 L.R.A. (N.s.) 601 (1909), rehearing, 55 Ore. 474, 106 Pac. 1022, 42 L.R.A.
(N.s.) 613 (1910), writ of error dismissed, 227 U.S. 150, 33 Sup. Ct. 220, 57 L. Ed.
458 (1913) ; State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 273 (1948).
46. See, e.g., Stephens v. State, 73 Okla. Cr. 349, 121 P.2d 326 (1942).
47. See, e.g., Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. 70 (1820).
48. See In re Kemmler, 136, 436, 446, 10 Sup. Ct. 930, 34 L. Ed. 519 (1890);
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135, 25 L. Ed. 345 (1878) ; Hemans v. United States,
163 F.2d 228, 237 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947) ; Hobbs v. State,
133 Ind. 404, 32 N.S. 1019, 1021 (1893) ; Garcia v. Territory of New Mexico, I N.M.
415, 418 (1869); State v. Woodward, 68 W. Va. 66, 69 S.E. 385, 387 (1910); see 1
COOLEY, COiSTITUTrIONAL LImITATioNzS 694 (8th ed. 1927) ; 30 COL. L. REv. 1057 (1930);
35 GEo. L.J. 567 (1947).
49. See note 48 supra.
50. See, e.g., Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 32 N.E. 1019, 1021 (1893) ; see 1 COOLEY,
CoNsTITUTIONAL LimiTATioNs 694 (8th ed. 1927). S.C. CoNsT. Art. I, § 19 provides:
"Corporal punishment shall not be inflicted."
51. In re Candido, 31 Hawaii 982 (1931) ; Foote v. Maryland, 59 Md. 264 (1883);
Garcia v. Territory of New Mexico, 1 N.M. 415 (1869) ; Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 6
Rand. 694 (Va. 1828). The present statutory law of Delaware contemplates the use of
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advanced, and given some credence, that "degrading" punishments are pro-
hibited ;52 but it is questionable that any punishment would be rejected on
this basis alone. Again, it has been said that a new punishment is "unusual,
' '53
but executions by use of electricity 4 and lethal gas, 5 both of recent origin,
have been upheld.
Death per se, certainly when befitting the offense, is not a cruel and
unusual punishment.5 In addition to infliction of the death penalty by the
methods of electrocution and lethal gas, shooting57 and hanging 8 have been
permitted. An interesting question arises with regard to the permissibility of
infliction of death after a previous, abortive attempt at execution. The Supreme
Court of the United States has held such a punishment by a state to be per-
missible,59 but not without a vigorous dissent6" which considered the analogy
to the torture of a lingering death.
Probaby the most timely items with regard to which the prohibition may
be invoked are four in number: (1) habitual-criminal statutes, (2) steriliza-
tion of criminals, (3) chain-gang incarceration, and (4) disproportionate
punishments.
Little need be said with regard to habitual-criminal statutes. Of course,
the punishments inflicted under these may be of such type or proportion as
to render them unconstitutional."' However, the mere imposition on the
multiple offender of a penalty heavier than that placed upon the novice law-
breaker has uniformly been held not cruel and unusual.
62
whipping as a punishment. See DEL. REv. CODE c.155, §§ 5301, 5328 (1935). For a recent
treatment of whipping, see Elliott, Coercion in Penal Treatment: Past and Present, Fed.
Probation, June, 1949, p. 22, 24.
52. Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687 (D. Nev. 1918) ; see Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed.
413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd on ground question moot, 242 U.S. 468, 37 Sup. Ct. 208,
61 L. Ed. 441 (1917) ; 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 694 (8th ed. 1927).
53. See Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687, 690 (D. Nev. 1918).
54. In re Storti, 178 Mass. 549, 60 N.E. 210, 52 L.R.A. 520 (1901) ; People ex rel.
Kemmler v. Durston, 119 N.Y. 569, 24 N.E. (1890), 6 aft'd, 136 U.S. 436, 10 Sup. Ct.
930, 34 L. Ed. 519 (1890).
55. Hernandez v. State, 43 Ariz. 424, 32 P.2d 18 (1934) ; State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev.
418, 211 Pac. 676, 30 A.L.R. 1443 (1923).
56. Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 At. 417 (1914) ; see In re Storti, 18 Mass,
549, 60 N.E. 210, 52 L.R.A. 520 (1901); State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418, 211 Pac. 676,
681, 30 A.L.R. 1443 (1923) ; People ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston, 119 N.Y. 569, 24 N.E.
6, 7 (1890), aff'd, 136 U.S. 436, 447, 18 Sup. Ct. 930, 34 L. Ed. 519 (1890).
57. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134, 25 L. Ed. 345 (1878).
58. State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628, 190 N.W. 38 (1922) ; State v. Butchek, 121 Ore.
141, 253 Pac. 367 (1927).
59. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 67 Sup. Ct. 374, 91 L. Ed.
422 (1947), 35 GEo. L.J. 567, 31 MARQ. L. REV. 108, 19 MIss. L.J. 99, 22 ST. JonN's L.
REv. 270 (1948), 20 TEMP. L.Q. 584, 21 TULANE L. REV. 480.
60. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, supra note 59 at 472.
61. E.g., Stephens v. State, 73 Okla. Cr. 349, 121 P.2d 326 (1942).
62. E.g., State ex rel. Drexel v. Alvis, 153 Ohio St. 244, 91 N.E.2d 22 (1950);
E.r parte Hibbs, 86 Okla. Cr. 113, 190 P.2d 156 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 835 (1948).
For a discussion of the present situation regarding habitual criminal acts, see Tappan,
Habitual Offender Laws in the United States, Fed. Probation, Mar., 1949, p. 28.
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The courts are not in agreement whether sterilization amounts to a cruel
and unusual punishment. Many statutes providing for this treatment may fall
on other grounds-e.g., denial of equal protection. 63 Others, especially those
providing for sterilization of mental defectives, may escape scrutiny under the
prohibition on the ground that they are eugenic rather than punitive in na-
ture.64 However, where such provisions have been penal in nature, some have
been held bad, emphasis being placed on the degrading character of the punish-
ment.5 Other courts have seen nothing cruel and unusual about steriliza-
tion.00 Actually, the authorities are too few to permit a prediction of the
future of sterilization of criminals as affected by prohibitions against cruel
and unusual punishments.
Enough courts have held the treatment imposed upon members of a
chain gang to be cruel and unusual" to suggest the generalization that the
use of chains is, in and of itself, prohibited. However, these cases involve
abusive treatment to such an extent, in addition to the use of chains,68 that
they cannot be considered authority against mere incarceration in chains.
Apparently, the question is open ;60 and it is arguable that a reasonable use
of chains could be prohibited logically only if the ideal prevails that degrading
punishment is cruel and unusual.
The objection that a punishment is cruel and unusual is raised most
frequently on the grounds that the punishment is excessive. While it has
been held that the cruel-and-unusual constitutional provision is no limitation
upon the severity of a punishment, 7' it seems that the real vitality of the
provision depends upon those cases which do include excessive penalties within
the limitation.72 The point is memorably illustrated by the Oregon case of
63. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 Sup. Ct. 1110, 86 L. Ed. 1655 (1942), 2
BILL OF RIGHTS REv. 296.
64. State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 299 Pac. 668 (1931) ; Smith v. Command, 231
Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925).
65. Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687 (D. Nev. 1918) ; see Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed.
413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), res'd on ground question moot, 242 U.S. 468, 37 Sup. Ct. 208,
61 L. Ed. 441 (1917).
66. State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75, 41 L.R.A. (N.s.) 418, Ann. Cas.
1914B, 512 (1912) ; see In re Opinion of the Justices, 230 Ala. 543, 162 So. 123 (1935).
67. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 Sup. Ct. 544, 54 L. Ed. 703 (1910) ;
Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949), re-'d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864,
70 Sup. Ct. 146, 94 L. Ed. 67 (1949), 23 So. CALIF. L. RFv. 86, 23 TEmP. L.Q. 234
(1950) ; Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1950) ; Harper v. Wall,
85 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.J. 1949) ; cf. Ex parte Marshall, 85 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.J. 1949);
see Note, 2 STAN. L. Rzv. 174 (1949).
68. See note 67 supra.
69. See Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 828 (1950).
70. Of course, some constitutions expressly prohibit disproportionate punishments
wholly apart from the cruel and unusual provision. E.g., ILL. CoNST. Art. II, § 11.
71. State v. Griffin, 84 N.J.L. 429, 87 Atl. 138 (Sup. Ct. 1913), aff'd, 85 N.J.L. 613,
90 Atl. 259 (1914) ; see People v. Morris, 80 Mich. 634, 45 N.W. 591, 592 (1890).
72. E.g., State v. Ross, 55 Ore. 450, 104 Pac. 596, 42 L.R.A. (N.s.) 601 (1909),
rehearing, 55 Ore. 474, 106 Pac. 1022, 42 L.R.A. (x.s.) 613 (1910), writ of error dis-
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State v. Ross,73 where directors of a trust company, convicted of larceny of
$288,426.87, were fined more than a half million dollars and sentenced to
imprisonment not exceeding some 790 years in case of failure to pay the fine.
The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed this life imprisonment and, on re-
hearing, reversed the imposition of the fine, because it was apparently beyond
the power of the defendants to pay in their lifetime. A number of less im-
pressive decisions have overturned sentences on the sole basis that the dura-
tion of imprisonment was excessive. 74 Certainly, there is enough authority
available to merit consideration of the possibility that a given punishment
may be so excessive as to violate a constitutional proscription of cruel and
unusual punishment.
CONCLUSION
Although the provisions of both state and federal law that cruel and un-
usual punishments shill not be imposed are considered popularly to relate
only to those punishments which exist solely in the books, the provisions
are not useless today. Recent cases have shown a tendency to expand the
scope of the prohibition, especially with regard to excessive punishment, and to
incorporate the proscription within the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. As respect, that which likely will be deemed cruel and unusual,
little can be done beyond noting those situations in which the limitation has
been applied. If a generalization is required, it must be as uncertain as any
other definition of a constitutional term: "[I]n order to justify a court in
declaring any punishment to be cruel and unusual .. . it must be so pro-
portioned to the offsense committed that it shocks the moral sense of all
reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances."75
JOHN L. BOwVERS, JR.
J. L. BoREm, JR'
missed, 227 U.S 150, 33 Sup. Ct. 220, 57 L. Ed. 458 (1913) ; State v. Kimbrough, 212
S.C. 348, 46. S.E.2d 273 (1948) ; see 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 692 (8th
ed. 1927)...
. 73. 55 Ore. 450, 104 Pac. 596, 42 L.R.A. (x.s.) 601 (1909)', rehearing, 55 Ore. 474,
106 Pac. 1022, 42 L.R.A. (N.s.) 613 (1910), writ of error dismissed, 227 U.S. 150, 33
Sup. Ct. 220, 57 L. Ed. 458 (1913) ; cf. State ex rel. Garvey v. Whitaker, 48 La. Ann. 527,
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